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ABSTRACT
Firstly, this paper examines the relative differences in observed
hours of work, consumption (income) and welfare among individuals  and
households in Peru in 1985-1986. For this purpose a Gini-related measure of
inequality is employed.
Secondly, the paper reports the results of some basic policy simu-
lations which are based on a structural micro-econometric model. The main
purpose has been to examine the impact of changes in wage rates and in
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INTRODUCTION
The evaluation of inequality in the distribution of income and
other resources is of fundamental importance in order to make judgment of
the welfare and the level of living in a society. This is of particular
relevance for many developing countries since it is often believed that the
inequality in the distribution of resources is large while there is some-
times a lack of empirical evidence to support these claims.
Most of the available empirical information on economic inequality
in developing countries refers to the distribution of income among earners.
This information constitutes an important part of a complete description of
the labor market and the related distribution of income, but it is less
helpful in the analysis of inequality as a welfare issue. A more relevant
indicator of welfare is per capita (or per adult equivalent) household
income or consumption. The present paper uses this indicator in an analysis
of inequality based on data from the Peruvian Living Standards Survey
(POS) in 1985-86. Our methodological approach is based on a summary
measure of inequality which is closely related to the Gini coefficient. The
essential difference is that our proposed measure of inequality gives more
weight than the Gini coefficient to transfers that is related to the very
poor.
Based on a structural micro-econometric model given in Dagsvik and
Aaberge (1989), we have performed some basic policy simulations. The
purpose has been to examine the impact of changes in the wage rates and in
length of schooling, respectively, on production, consumption and time
allocation, as well as on economic welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses in more
detail the employed measure of inequality. Section 3 deals with the de-
scription of the labor market activity and the related distribution of
income based on an inequality analysis of distributions of hours of work
and . consumption. In Section 4 we examine economit welfare based on per
capita household consumption as an indicator of welfare. Sections 3 and 4
cover Lima, other urban areas and rural areas while Section 5 deals with
policy simulations for Lima. Section 6 contains a brief summary and the
conclusion.
2. MEASUREMENT AND DECOMPOSITION OF INEQUALITY
A common approach for measuring inequality in distributions of
income is to employ the Gini coefficient, which satisfies the principles of
scale invariance and transfers. The principle of scale invariance states
that inequality should remain unaffected if each income is altered by the
same proportion and it requires, therefore, the inequality measure to be
independent of the scale of measurement, The principle of transfers
implies that if a transfer of income takes place from a richer to a poorer
person without changes in the relative positions, the level of inequality
diminishes. The reader is referred to Sen (1972) for a more comprehensive
discussion of the normative implications of different measures of inequa-
lity.
As is wellknown, the Gini coefficient (G) is related to the Lorenz






The Gini coefficient offers a method for ranking distributions and quanti-
fying the differences in inequality between distributions. This strategy,
however, suffers from certain inconveniences. Evidently; no single measure
can reflect all aspects of inequality of a distribution, only summarize it
to a certain extent. Consequently, it is important to have alternatives to
the Gini coefficient. As pointed out by Atkinson (1970), the Gini coeffi-
cient assigns more weight to transfers in the centre of an unimodal distri-
bution that at the tails. As an alternative to the Gini coefficient, we
will employ an inequality measure - the A-coefficient - that assigns more
weight to transfers at the lower tail than at the centre and the upper
tail.
The A-coefficient, see Aaberge (1986), has a similar geometric in-
terpretation and relation to the inequality curve M defined by
(2.2) 	 M(u) MIX 	 F-1 (u)] 
EX 9
as the Gini coefficient has to the Lorenz curve. Here X has distribution





If X is an income variable, then M(u) for a fixed u expresses the ratio of
the mean income of the poorest 100u percent of the population to the mean
income of the populåtion. 	 As is wellknown, the egalitarian line of the
Lorenz curve is the straight line joining the points (0,0) and (1,1). 	 The
egalitarian line of the M-curve is the horizontal line joining the points
(0,1) and OM. Thus, the universe of M-curves is bounded by a unit
square, while the universe of Lorenz-curves is bounded by a triangle.
Therefore, there is a sharper visual distinction between two different
M-curves than between the two corresponding Lorenz curves. Note that the
M-curve will be equal to the diagonal line (M(u)=u) if and only if the
underlying distribution is uniform (0,a) for an arbritary a. The A-coeffi-
cient then take the value 0.5, while the maximum attainable value is 1 and
the minimum attainable value is O.
Note that M(u) = L(u)/u, which implies
1 	uNI
(2.4 	 A 	 = 	 f [1 f-=.1-=4]du .
' 	 0 	 u
Alternative expressions for G and A are given by
(2.5 1 	 c° 	
l oe
•EX
S f (y-x)dF(x)dF(y) 	 = 	 S y(2F(y)-1)dF(y)EX
00
and
(2.6) 	 A EX
1 	 Y (y-x) f 	 dF(x)dF(y) 	 = 	 !EX--f y(l+logF(y))dF(y)0 	F(y)	 ,0
respectively.
Given the inequality in the distribution function F measured by A
or G, the next step is to identify the sources that make substantial con-
tribution to the inequality. Assume that the main variable X is the sum
of s different factor components,
(2.7)
According to Aaberge (1986), A and G satisfy the following decomposition
rules
SP
(2.8) 	 A 
i=1/-1
where p i /p is the ratio between the means of X i and X, respectively, and a i
is, loosely spoken, the conditional A-inequality of factor i given the
units rank order in X. Analogously,
S p i
(2.9) 	 G 	 yi
1 = 1 P
where y i related to G has a similar interpretation as a i related to A.
Notice that a i and y i are measures of interaction between factor i,
X i , and the sum X. Assume for example that p i > O. Then, a negative value
of a i or y i expresses negative interaction and means that factor i has an
equalizing effect on the inequality in the distribution F of X. A positive
value expresses -a disequalizing effect on the inequality in F. For p i < 0,
then positive values of a i and y i express an equalizing effect on the in-
equality in F.
3. INEQUALITY IN OBSERVED DISTRIBUTIONS OF HOURS OF WORK AND CONSUMPTION
IN PERU IN 1985-86
In this section we provide information on the labor market partici-
pation and income formation among households in Peru using the data gather-
ed by PLSS. In particular, we focus on the distributions of hours of work
among employed persons and households, respectively. The main goal is to
estimate inequality in distributions of hours of work, i.e. relative diffe-
rences in hours of work among persons and among households. In addition, we
identify the contribution from wage work, agricultural selfemployment, non-
agrigultural selfemployment and unpaid family work to the distribution of
hours of work among employed females, males and children, respectively.
More precisely, we decompose the inequality in the actual distributions of
hours of work with respect to the ahove mentioned groups. A similar app-
roach is taken to assess the contribution of wage work, farm activity, non-
farm activity and unpaid family work for females, males and children, res-
pectively, to the inequality in distributions of hours of work among house-
holds and the contribution of wage earnings from females, males and child-
ren, respectively, to the inequality in distributions of consumption (in-
come) among households. In this way we obtain important information about
the distribution of income and the functioning of the labor market. The im-
plications for the economic welfare among households and individuals are
examined in section 4 on the basis of household consumption relative to a
certain equivalence scale.
3.1. Inequality in distributions of hours of work among persons
In this section individuals are classified as employed if they
worked one hour or more during the seven days or twelve months prior to the
survey. We examine the following populations,
- employed females between 15 and 70 years old,
- employed males between 15 and 70 years old,
- employed children between 7 and 14 years old.
Definition and measurement of annual hours of work are reported in
Appendix 2 and correspond to the definition used in Dagsvik and Aaberge
(1989).
In Table 1 we report the regional employment participation rates
for children, males, married and unmarried females.
Table 1. Employment participation rates for children males, married and








(7-14) 	 (15-70) 	 All 	 Married 	 Unmarried
Peru . . . 	 . ..... 	 33 	 82 	 64 	 69 	 57
Lima . . . .•• ..... ••• 	 11 	 77 	 51 	 55 	 47
Other urban .. 	 . 	 17 	 76 	 56 	 62 	 49
Rural ... .•••• ..... 	 54 	 91 	 79 	 81 	 75
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Participation rates for both females, males and children are con-
siderably greater in rural areas than in urban areas of Peru. Furthermore,
participation rates for married females are higher than participation rates
for unmarried females. For children, the participation rate for those
living in rural areas is 400 per cent higher than for those living in Lima.
When they do work, children in rural areas on the average work considerably
longer than children in urban areas, see Table 2. Similar result holds for
females, but not to same extent for males.
Table 2. Annual mean hours of work for employed children, males, married








(7-14) 	 (15-70) 	 All 	 Married 	 Unmarried
Peru . 	 .... 	 911 	 2351 	 1746 	 1728 	 1775
Lima .... .... ...... 	 565 	 2356 	 1594 	 1580 	 1611
Other urban ..•. 	 681 	 2286 	 1656 	 1613 	 1717
Rural ... . ... 	 .... 	 991 	 2388 	 1868 	 1844 	 1912
The mean figures in Table 2 may cover large individual differences
in hours of work. By estimating the inequality in the corresponding dis-
tributions of hours of work, we obtain relevant information about the indi-
vidual differences in hours of work. 	 For this purpose we employ the
A-coefficient. 	 Corresponding results based on the Gini coefficient are
given in Appendix 1.
Peru • • • • • • • •
Lima ..........
Other urban .....



























Table 3. ik-inequality*) in distributions of hours of work for employed






Region 	 (7-14) 	 (15-70) 	 All 	 Married Unmarried
*) Standard deviations are given in parentheses.
The figures in Table 3 clearly demonstrate large individual varia-
tions in hours of work, particularly among children and females. For
children and for females, except for those living in rural areas, the in-
equality in distributions of hours of work is significantly higher than if
the observations were generated from a uniform (0,a) distribution for an
arbritary a. There are, however, not significant discrepancies in inequa-
lity between the corresponding distributions of hours of work for married
and unmarried females. Inequality is lowest in the rural area for both
children, males and females.
The observed distributions of hours of work are the result of a
process where the individuals make decisions on hours of work in each





(4) unpaid family work.
By decomposing the overall inequality in the distribution of hours of work
with respect to the four above mentioned sectors, we obtain information
about the contribution of each sector to the overall inequality. (Here it
is understood that the behavioral labor market adjustments are given).
By applying the decomposition (2.8) for the A-coefficient we obtain
the results presented in Tables 4, 5 and 6 . The first and second column
1 0
display the relative contribution from the sectors to overall inequality
• and to total hours of work, respectively. 	 The third column gives the
interaction coefficients. 	 The positive interaction coefficients demon-
strate that each sector has a disequalizing influence on the distributions
of hours of work for both children, males and females in each region. Note
that the sectors contribution to overall inequality are equal to the pro-
ducts of the figures in columns two and three divided by 100. Consequently,
the sum of the first four inequality contributions in Table 4 is equal to
the overall inequality (0.521) in the distribution of hours of work for
females in Peru.
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Table 4. Decomposition of the A-inequality*) in distributions of hours of
work with respect to wage work (1), non-agrigultural selfemploy-
ment (2), agricultural selfemployment (3) and unpaid family work
(4) for females by region
Fraction of
Region 	 overall in-
Employment equality
(Levél of inequality) 	 sector 	 (per cent)
Fraction of
total hours
of work 	 Interaction

































































Fraction of overall inequality =
Fraction of total hours of work) • (Interaction coefficient) 
Overall inequality
Example:
.0 . 0.Wage sectors fraction of overall inequality i 	 22Peru - 	 .0.521 
518 	21 9
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Table 5. Decomposition of the A-inequality in distributions of hours of
work with respect to wage work (1), non-agricultural selfemploy-
ment (2), agricultural selfemployment (3) and unpaid family work
(4) for males by region
Fraction of Fraction of
Region 	 overall in- total hours
Employment equality 	 of work 	 Interaction
(Level of inequality) 	 sector 	 (per cent) 	 (per cent) 	 coefficient
1 	 39.9 	 42.9 	 0.368
Peru 	 2 	 27.2 	 20.3 	 0.531
(0.396) 	 3 	 17.7 	 16.1 	 0.435
4 	 15.2 	 20.7 	 0.292
1 	 58.3 	 66.6 	 0.348
Lima 	 2+3 	 40.4 	 29.8 	 0.539
(0.398) 	 4 	 1.3 	 3.6 	 0.144
1 	 44.7 	 50.4 	 0.385
Other urban 	 2+3 	 50.7 	 39.4 	 0.558
(0.434) 	 4 	 4.6 	 10.2 	 0.195
1 	 26.8 	 24.4 	 0.403
Rural 	 2 	 8.3 	 6.8 	 0.451
(0.370) 	 3 	 35.2 	 31.9 	 0.409
4 	 29.7 	 36.9 	 0.298
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Table 6. Decomposition of the A-inequality in distributions of hours of
work with respect to wage work (1), non-agricultural selfemploy-
ment (2), agricultural selftmployment (3) and unpaid family work
(4) for children by region
Fraction of Fraction of
Region 	 overall in- total hours
Employment equality 	 of work 	 Interaction
(Level of inequality) 	 sector 	 (per cent) 	 (per cent) 	 coefficient
1 	 4.3 	 5.4 	 0.469
Peru 	 2 	 1.8 	 1.7 	 • 0.645
(0.588) 	 3 	 0.7 	 0.6 	 0.710
4 	 93.2 	 92.4 	 0.593
1 	 19.7 	 19.2 	 0.708
Lima 	 2+3 	 13.1 	 12.0 	 0.754
(0.691) 	 4 	 67.3 	 68.8 	 0.676
1 	 15.5 	 14.5 	 0.667
Other urban 	 2+3 	 2.2 	 2.7 	 0.515
(0.627) 	 4 	 ' 82.3 	 82.6 	 0.624
1 	 2.3 	 3.3 	 0.376
Rural 	 2 	 1.5 	 0.9 	 0.866
(0.557) 	 3 	 0.9 	 0.7 	 0.661
4 	 95.4 	 95.0 	 0.560
According to the results in Tables 4, 5 and 6 wage work plays a
predominant role for females and males living in Lima and for males living
in other urban areas. In rural areas, the majority of hours of work for
both females and males is in the agricultural sector. The wage sector con-
tributes, however, by almost 25 per cent of total hours of work for males
living in the rural areas.
Unpaid family work is the predominant activity among the children
who work. Still, almost 20 per cent of the children's total hours of work
in Lima is wage work ativity. The large interaction coefficients in Table
6 suggest that children with long hours of work on average work longer
hours in each sector than children with short total hours of work. To a
certain extent this conclusion is also valid for both males and females.
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There is, however, a weak interaction between hours worked as unpaid family
worker and total hours of work among males. This means that males with
short total hours of work on average do nearly as much unpaid family work
as males with long total hours of work.
3. 	 Inequality in.distributions of hours of work among households 
In this section we examine the distribution of hours of work for
households, similarly to the results for individuals reported above.
Table 7 provides some basic statistics on household composition and
hours of work. As one can see, the regional differences in household size
is not very large. However, in spite of almost equal average household
sizes, households in rural areas have both more children and more old
people than households in urban areas. Still, the rural households have on
average considerably larger mean annual hours of work than households
living in urban areas.
To obtain information about the relative spread of the households
distributions of hours of work we employ the A-coefficient, as we did when
examining the ditributions of hours of work among individuals.
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Table 7. Household composition and annual mean hours of work for households
by region
Other
Region 	 Peru 	 Lima 	 urban 	 Rural
Number of observations .............. 	 5106 	 1370 	 1460 	 2276
Household size 	 ............ 	 5.1 	 5.1 	 5.3 	 5.1
Number of children, 0-6 years old 	 0.95 	 0.71 	 0.90 	 1.12
*Number of children, 7-14 years old .. 	 1.13 	 0.97 	 , 1.15 	 1.20
Number of females, 15-70 years old . 	 1.5 	 1.7 	 1.6 	 1.3
Number of males, 15-70 years old .... 	 1.4 	 1.6 	 1.5 	 1.3
Number of people above 70 years old . 	 0.15 	 0.13 	 0.14 	 0.17
Total hours of work for household 	 5170 	 4533 	 4492 	 5976
Mean households hours of work per
	individual in agegroup 15-70 years 	 1874 	 1497 	 1574 	 2292
Relative number of employed females
	(15-70 years old) per household ... 	 0.61 	 0.49 	 0.55 	 0.72
Relative number of employed males
	(15-70 years old) per household ... 	 0.76 	 0.74 	 0.72 	 0.79
Table 8. A-inequality*) in distributions of hours
of work among households by region
Other















*) Standard deviation in paranthesis.
Table 8 provides information on the relative variation in total hours of
work among households in Peru and in regions of Peru. The figures for Lima
and other urban areas are approximately equal to the inequality in a uni-
form(0,a) distribution. Similarly to the corresponding distribution of
hours of work among individuals (reported in Table 3) the level of inequa-
lity is lowest in the rural area
Next we examine the influence on the distribution of hours of work
among households from the differedt types of employment activities for
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children (7-14), males (15-70) and females (15-70), respectively. The
different categories we use to decompose the overall inequality in the dis-
tribution of hours of work among households are as follows:
(Cl) - childrens hours of work in the wage sector,
(C2)- childrens hours of work in non-agricultural selfemployment,
(C3)- childrens hours of work in agricultural selfemployment,
(C4) 	 childrens hours of work in unpaid family work,
(M1)- males hours of work in the wage sector,
(M2)- males hours of work in non-agricultural selfemployment,
(M3)- males hours of work in agricultural selfemployment,
(M4)- males hours of work in unpaid family work,
(F1)- females hours of work in the wage sector,
(F2)- females hours of work in non-agricultural selfemployment,
(F3)- females hours of work in agricultural selfemployment
(F4)- females hours of work in unpaid family work.
The total hours of work (h) for each household is given by
4
(2.10) h = 	 (Ci+Mi+Fi).
i=1
The results of the decomposition are given in Tables 9 to 12.
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Table 9 	 Decomposition of the A-inequality in the distribution of
hours of work among households living in Peru with respect
to chiidrens, males and females hours of work in wage work,
non-agricultural selfemployment, agricultural selfemploy-
ment and unpaid family work, respectively
Fraction of
Fraction of 	 total hours
Hours of work 	 overall inequ- 	 of work 	 Interaction
component 	 ality (per cent) 	 (per cent) 	 coefficient
Cl 	 0.4 	 0.4 	 0.511
C2 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.438
C3 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 '0.731
C4 	 10.6 	 7.0 	 0.737
M1 	 16.1 	 23.8 	 0.329
M2 	 9.7 	 11.7 	 0.402
M3 	 9.2 	 9.3 	 0.482
M4 	 16.4 	 12.1 	 0.659
Fl 	 6.3 	 7.8 	 0.395
F2 	 8.2 	 8.5 	 0.471
F3 . 	 2.5 	 2.8 	 0.434
F4 	 20.5 	 16.5 	 0.606
Table 10. Decomposition of the A-inequality in the distribution of
hours of work among households living in Lima with respect
to childrens, males and females hours of work in wage work,
selfemployment and unpaid family work, respectively
Fraction of
Fraction of 	 total hours
Hours of work 	 overall inequ- 	 of work 	 Interaction
' component 	 ality (per cent ) 	 (per cent) 	 coefficient
Cl 	 0.6 	 0.4 	 0.735
C2+C3 	 0.1 	 0.2 	 0.363
C4 	 1.6 	 1.1 	 0.753
M1 	 36.1 	 42.8 	 0.420
M2+M3 	 21.0 	 20.0 	 0.521
M4 	 3.6 • 	 2.6 	 0.684
Fl 	 18.4 	 17.4 	 0.526
F2+F3 	 12.4 	 10.9 	 0.565
F4 	 6.2 	 4.7 	 0.656
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Table 11. Decomposition of the A-inequality in the distribution of
hours of work among households living in other urban areas
with respect to childrens, males and females hours of work
in wage work, selfemployment and unpaid family work,
respectively
Fraction of
Fraction of 	 total hours
Hours of work 	 overall inequ- 	 of work 	 Interaction
component 	 ality (per cent) 	 (per cent) 	 coefficient
Cl 	 0.4 	 0.5 	 0.453
C2+C3 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.284
C4 	 4.1 	 2.8 	 0.737
M1 ' 	 23.4 	 30.2 	 0.381
M2+M3 	 24.9 	 24.3 	 0.504
M4 	 8.6 	 6.7 	 0.633
Fl 	 7.9 	 9.2 	 0.423
F2+F3 	 18.5 	 16.3 	 0.557
F4 	 12.2 	 10.1 	 0.593
Table 12. Decomposition of the A-inequality in the distribution of
hours of work among households living in rural areas with
respect to childrens, males and females hours of work in
wage work, non-agricultural selfemployment, agricultural

















Cl 	 0.4 	 0.4 	 0.403
C2 	 0.1 	 0.1 	 0.599
C3 	 0.1. 	0.1	 0.621
C4 	 16.7 	 11.7 	 0.652
M1 	 - 	 8.7 	 12.0 	 0.320
M2 	 2.2 	 3.5 	 - 0.286
M3 	 11.9 	 16.4 	 0.331
M4 	 23.8 	 19.0 	 0.573
Fl 	 2.3 	 2.8 	 0.380
F2 	 3.3 	 4.1 	 0.376
F3 	 3.0 	 4.9 	 0.281
F4 	 27.5 	 24.9 	 0.506
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The results in Tables 9-12 can be summarized as follows:
males wage work plays a predominant role for the households labor
supply both in Lima and other urban areas with a fraction of hours
of work of 42.8 per cent and 30.2 per cent, respectively
females and males unpaid family work and males work in agricultural
selfemployment contribute by 24.9'percent, 19 per cent and 16.4
per cent, respectively, of the household total market activities in
rural areas
childrens labor supply is considerably higher in rural areas than
in urban areas. In rural areas childrens unpaid family work con-
stitute almost 12 per cent of the households total hours of work
- the positive interaction coefficients demonstrate that females,
males and childrens activities in each sector contribute to produce
the large relative variation in households total hours of work
- the large interaction coefficients of childrens unpaid family work
mean that children in households with high labor supply work
considerably longer hours in unpaid family work than children in
households with low or moderate labor supply
- the large interaction coefficients of females and males 	 unpaid
family work show that there is a strong correlation between females
and males hours of work in unpaid family work, respectively, and
the households total hours of work
- the interaction coefficients of males wage work are relatively
small and lead to a lower relative contribution of males wage work
to overall inequality than to total hours of work. The explanation
is that males living in households with lower hours of work on ave-
rage contribute more to males total hours of work in wage work than
the related households contribute to total hours of work for house-
holds.
3.3. Inequality in distributions of consumption among households
This section and Section 4 deal with the measurement of economic
inequality in Peru. Evidently, any study of economic inequality require
decisions about:
i) the definition of income,
ii) the unit of observation,
iii) the period of time over which the chosen income variable is
measured
and
iv 	 a summary measure of inequality.
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The basic income variable used in this paper is consumption defined
as follows:
	
consumption = 	 wage earnings
	
+ 	 net entrepreneurial income
+ I other income.
Note that this definition is consistent with the one used by
Dagsvik and Aaberge (1989), see also Appendix 2.
A consequence of this definition is that savings become included in
consumption. Note also that consumption of home-grown food and other
in-kind income is given a monetary value so that net entrepreneurial income
include consumption of these items. The basic unit of observation is the
household and the reference period is one year. With this concepts the "1"
in the definition of consumption means ,sum over all persons who where
living in the household during the year in question.
In Section 2 we discused the basic properties that a summary
measure of inequality ought to fulfil. Since the Gini-coefficient is rela-
tively insensitive to changes in the incomes of the very poor, we argued
that comparisons of inequality could alternatively be done in terms of the
A-coefficient (defined by (2.3)).
In Sections 3.1 and 3.2 we examined the inequality in distributions
of hours of work among personš and households, respectively. In spite of
the large inequalities in distributions of hours of work we can not, how-
ever, automatically infer from them immediate implications regarding the
inequalities in the corresponding distributions of household consumption.
The distribution of consumption is the result of the preferred hours in
combination with offered wage rates and product prices and will therefore
depend on the wage rate, the returns to selfemployment activities, hours of
work in wage work and in selfemployment and non-labor income and the asso-
ciation between these variables. For example if households with high
returns to their selfemployment activities work longer hours than house-
holds with low returns to their selfemployment activities and if in addi-
tion there exists a positive association between wage rates and the house-
holds hours of work in the wage sector, then we must expect larger inequa-
lity in the distribution of consumption than in the distribution of hours
of work.
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Table 13 provides information about the mean, the median and the
inequality in the distributions of household consumption by region. Note
that the estimates given in Sections 3.3 and 4 are based on fewer observa-
tions than the estimates given in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. The reason is that
we have excluded households with observed negative net entrepreneurial
income from the sample when dealing with consumption distributions. The
large figures of the A-coefficient in Table 13 reveal extreme inequalities
in the observed distributions of consumption. The mean consumption of the
richest 5 per cent of the households in Peru is for example 128 times the
mean consumption of the poorest 50 per cent of the households and 1355
times the mean consumption of the poorest 10 per cent of the households.
Table 13. Mean*), median and A-inequality in distributions of consumption
among households by region
Other
Peru 	 Lima 	 urban 	 Rural
Number of observations . ... 	 4622 	 1287 	 1316 	 2019
Mean .. 	 .... 	 ... 	 .............
	
. 	 42500 	 40120 	 71104 	 25373
(10066) 	 (2250) 	 (32912) 	 (8273),
Median .. • 	 ....... 	 ...... 	 11433 	 22344 	 15660 	 4423
A-inequality . 	 ••••• ••• 	 0.864 	 0.680 	 0.892 	 0.895
(0.033) 	 (0.016) 	 (0.049) 	 (0.034)
Intis figures are at June 1985 prices. Standard deviations are given in
the parantheses.
By comparing Tables 8 and 13 we find that the inequality in the
distribution of consumption is considerably higher in rural areas than in
Lima even though the households hours of work were more equally distributed
in rural areas than in Lima.
In addition to characterizing the regional inequalities in the dis-
tributions of consumption in Peru it is important to disentangle why in-
equality vary across regions. To do so, we gauge the contribution of diffe-
rent income sources to overall inequality by decomposing the inequality in
the actual distributions of consumption with respect to females, males and
childrens wage earnings, respectively, and also with respect to the house-
holds net entrepreneurial income and other income. By applying the decompo-
sition (2.8) of the A-coefficient we obtain the results presented in Table
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15. (The interpretation of the terms in Table 15 is outlined in Sections 2
and 3.1.) To give the reader an impression of the variations behind the co-
efficients for Peru in Table 15, we have decomposed in Table 14 the deciles
of consumption for households in Peru with respect to earnings for females,
males and children, and with respect to the households entrepreneurial
income and other income. Since the decile specific mean wage earnings in
the column for females is strongly increasing with increasing decile, the
corresponding interaction coefficient takes a large positive value, in ac-
cordance with the estimate (0.842) given in Table 15. However, if the
decile specific means were equal, the corresponding interaction coeffici-
ent would have been zero, or approximately zero.
Table 14. Mean consumption for households living in Peru by deciles decom-
posed with respect to females, males and childrens wage earnings





Decile specific mean 	 Decile 	 Decile
wage earnings for 	 specific 	 specific
mean net 	 mean of
	  entrepreneurial other
females 	 males children income 	 income





















	 	 40 	 2 	 324 	 18
	
80 	 222 	 15 	 1296 	 87
	
192 	 793 	 27 	 2268 	 163
	
387 	 1984 	 42 	 3270 	 394
	
884 	 3634 	 29 	 4203 	 718
	
1367 	 6086 	 63 	 5244 	 883
	
1741 	 8220 	 35 	 7630 	 1456
	
3310 	 10902 	 214 	 10723 	 1924
	
4718 	 15592 	 53 	 16970 	 3807
	
20460 	 31874 	 326 	 242670 	 7651
	
3315 	 7948 	 85 	 29461 	 1691
Note that the means in the first column are equal to the sum of the related








































































Table 15. Decomposition of the A-inequality in the distribution of con-
sumption with respect to females, males and childrens wage
earnings, respectively, and with respect to the households net
entrepreneurial income and other income by region
Income
Region 	 (consumption)





































The predominant contribution to households consumption played by
males wage earnings in Lima reflects the predominant contribution to house-
holds hours of work played by males wage work (see Tables 10 and 15). Males
wage earnings contribute by almost 40 per cent of the household consumption
which is very close to the contribution of males wage work hours to house-
holds total hours of work. For females, the corresponding fractions are
both about 17 per cent. However, despite that this particular structure in
the distribution of hours of work among households is maintained in the
distribution of consumption among households, consumption is considerably
more unequal distributed than hours of work. The explanation is that the
interaction coefficients referring to the consumption distribution for
Lima, given in Table 15, are considerably larger than the corresponding
interaction coefficients related to the distribution of hours of work,
given in Table 10. This is due to skew distributed wage rates and a posi-
tive association between wage rates and hours of work. By applying a parti-
cular non-linear decomposition method (not reported here) we also found
that the wage rate has a stronger disequalizing effect on the distribution
of household consumption than hours of work in the wage sector. These
effects are stronger.for females than for males. Note that the interaction
coefficient for childrens wage earnings in Lima is weakly negative, which
means that childrens wage earnings have a modest equalizing effect on the
distribution of consumption among households. This effect is in contrast to
the effect of childrens wage work on the inequality of the distribution of
hours of work. Altogether, the childrens contribution to overall inequality
are in both cases of less importance as shown in the first column of Tables
10 and 15.
In contrast to the results for Lima, wage earnings in other urban
areas show a modest contribution to the households total consumption com-
pared to the contribution of households hours in wage work to the house-
holds total hours of work. The fractions are 17.1 per cent and 39.9
per cent, respectively. For the same reason as for Lima the interaction co-
efficients related to the distribution of consumption are considerably
larger than the corresponding interaction coefficients for the distribution
of hours of work. Similar results hold for the rural areas.
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4. INEQUALITY IN DISTRIBUTIONS OF PER CAPITA HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION
The descriptive analysis of Sections 3.1-3.3 provides essential in-
formation about labor supply and distributions of income, but it must be
interpreted with caution when used as basis for an analysis of welfare.
This is mainly due to the large variations in household size. To allow for
the fapt that for some households the total consumption (income) may be
shared by several persons while for others it may be enjoyed by just one or
a few persons, we need an alternative to household consumption as an indi-
cator of welfare. Clearly, an index of welfare constructed using the infor-
mation on household size and composition is required. In the PLSS data an
equivalence scale is constructed which accounts for the heterogeneity in
demographic composition of the households. Specifically, the costs for
children are specified in terms of fractions of one adult. The weights
given are 0.2 for children less than 7 years old, 0.3 for children between
7 and 12 years old, 0.5 for children between 13 and 17 and 1 for persons
above 17. The sum of these weights for each household is used as the scale.
Consumption per capita is defined as household consumption relative to the
equivalence scale and it is used as an indicator of household, welfare. Note
that these weights are consistent with similar weights estimated for Sri
Lanka and Indonesia by Deaton and Mullbauer (1986) and have previously been
applied by Glewwe (1987) in a descriptive analysis of the distribution of
welfare in Peru in 1985-86. Glewwe's analysis is based on expenditure data
and not on income data, as we do here.
Lack of sufficient data makes it impossible to distinguish consump-
tion levels among members of the household. Therefore, we have to assume
that the welfare level of an individual is equal to per capita household
consumption of the household within which he/she actually lives. Compari
sons will be made both between persons and between households, since it is
of particular interest to examine the relationship between the per capita
household consumption distribution among households and the per capita
household consumption distribution among persons.
Table 16 displays average welfare levels for females, males and
children living in Lima, other urban areas and rural areas, respectively.
The reported figures demonstrate considerable differences in average levels
of welfare between adults and children and between individuals living in
urban and rural areas. The large differences between corresponding medians
and means indicate extremely skew distributions, which is fully confirmed
by the estimates of the A-coefficient reported in Table 17.
Region Other
Peru 	 Lima 	 urban 	 RuralAmong
	.857	 .676 	 .881 	 .895
	
(.029) 	 (.017) 	 (.048) 	 (.032)
	
.856 	 .662 	 .883 	 .888




Table 16. Mean*) and median per capita household consumption among persons
by sex, age and region
Other
Popula- 	 Peru 	 Lima 	 urban areas 	 Rural areas -
tion
Mean Median 	 Mean Median 	 Mean Median 	 Mean Median
All ........ 11692 	 3332 	 10668 	 5983 	 19139 	 4190 	 7454 	 1404
	
(24126) 	 (6541) 	 (6952) 	 (10633)
Females ... 13282 	 3508 	 10406 	 6036 	 25154 	 4143 	 6654 	 1332
(above 15 	 (7376) 	 (2256) 	 (2185) 	 (2935)
years old
Males ...... 12207 	 3820 	 11529 	 6418 	 20013 	 4425 	 7097 	 1516
(above 15 	 (7004) 	 (2090) 	 (2054) 	 (2860)
years old)
Children .... 10118 	 2965 	 10118 	 5404 	 13630 	 3945 	 8150 	 1380
(below 15 	 (9746) 	 (2195) 	 (2713) 	 (4838)
years old)
*) Intis figures are at June 1985 prices. Number of observations are given
in the parantheses.
Table 17. A-inequality in distributions of per capita household consumption
among households and persons, respectively, by region
As can be seen in Table 17, there is only insignificant differences
in inequality between corresponding distributions of per capita household
consumption among households and persons, respectively. This result is in
accordance with the results for various less developed countries reported
in Berry (1988). More surprisingly is the fact that the inequality in
different distributions of per capita household consumption among house-
holds differs little from inequality in the corresponding distributions of
household consumption among households, see Tables 13 and 17. This result
is mainly due to an extremely unequal distribution of consumption (income)
in Peru in 1985-86. As reported by Glewwe (1987) this was also the case in
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1966 when the Oer capita income inequality among persons was measured equal
to 0.666 by the Gini-coefficient. Our estimate for the Gini-coefficient of
the distribution of per capita household consumption among persons in Peru
in 1985-86 is 0.789, see Appendix 1.
5. POLICY SIMULATION RESULTS FOR LIMA
The estimated econometric model reported in Dagsvik and Aaberge
(1989) allows us to perform rather complex simulation experiments where we
take into account observed heterogeneity that stem from age, schooling,
household size and composition. In addition, we account for unobserved
heterogeneity that in the model is represented by random error terms asso-
ciated with the wage, the conditional profit and the utility function.
After the model has been estimated it is possible to perform simulations
since we then "know" the parameters of the structural part of the utility,
the wage and the profit function, and the probability distributions of the
related random terms. For more details we refer to Dagsvik and Aaberge
(1989).
In this section we confine the analysis to households with at least
one female and one male adult where the households consumption per capita
does not exceed 20 000 Intis. Recall that this selection has not been made
in Sections 3 and 4. Therefore it does not make sense to make direct compa-
risons between tables in Sections 3 and 4 and tables in Section 5.
The simulation experiments that are undertaken here relate to the
effect from changes in wage rates and education on labor supply, wage
earnings, profit from selfemployment, consumption and on the distribution
3f economic welfare. The effect from changes in wage rates and in education
on the mean levels of hours of work, wage earnings and consumption are re-
ported in Dagsvik and Aaberge (1989), but for the sake of completeness we
have included the results here as well.
5.1. Wage effects
In Table 18 we report the effect of wage changes on participation
probabilities and on mean hours worked in each sector. The table shows that
a 20 per cent wage increase has only a small effect on labor supply. A 20
28
per cent wage increase for the females implies that their mean hours of
work and participation rate in the wage sector increase by 5.8 and 3.2
per cent, respectively. The effect on females mean hours and participation
rate in selfemployment is almost negligible. Also the cross effect on males
participation rates and mean hours of work in each sector is negligible.
Recall that the sum of the participation rates across sectors may
be greater than one because many individuals work in both sectors. When the
males wage rates are increased by 20 per cent, participation and mean hours
of work for males in the wage sector increase by 1.6 and 2.7 per cent, res-
pectively.
For the selfemployment sector, male participation and mean hours of
work decrease by 1.2 and 2 per cent, respectively. Female participation and
mean hours of work are reduced by 1.9 and 2.2 per cent in the selfemploy-
ment sectors. The reason why female labor supply decreases is due to the
income effect that stem from the increase in male wage earnings. When both
male and female wage rates are increased by 20 per cent, the impact is
similar but weaker.
The largest effect is obtained when the females wage rates are in-
creased by 20 per cent of the mean wage rate. Then participation and mean
hours in wage work increase by 3.8 and 8.0 per cent, respectively. By using
the results of Table 12 we obtain that the mean hours, given participation
in the wage work sector, increases by 4.0 per cent. However, the decrease
in participation and mean hours in the selfemployment sector is small. So
is also the change in male labor supply from this policy measure.
When males wage rates are increased by 20 per cent of the mean wage
rate then males participation and hours of work in the wage sector increase
by 2.1 and 3.8 per cent, respectively. In the selfemployment sector male
participation and mean hours decrease by 2.3 and 3.5 per cent. The corre-
sponding income effect implies that female participation and mean hours in
the wage sector decrease by 2.9 and 3.6 per cent, respectively, while there






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 19. Changes in mean level and inequality in the distribution of con-
sumption per capita among households as a result of wage incre-
ments. Percentage changes from base case
Mean level A-coefficient Gini-coefficient
Base case
	
7600 	 0.566 	 0.438
20 per cent increase in
females wages 	 5.3
20 per cent increase in
males wages 	 11.9
20 per cent increase in both
females and males wages 	 11.6
Female wage rates increased
by 20 per cent of the mean wage 	 4.9
Male wage rates increased by
20 per cent of the mean wage 	 6.4
Female and male wage rates
increased by 20 per cent







Table 19 demonstrates that percentage wage increments have a modest
effect on the inequality in the distribution of consumption per capita
among households. For 20 per cent relative wage changes the distributional
impact is very small while inequality is reduced by 3 per cent (A-coeffi-
cient) when the males wage rates are increased by 20 per cent of the mean
wage rate. This reduction in inequality corresponds to introducing a pro-
portional tax of 3 per cent and then increase each households per capita
consumption by an equal share of the total tax revenue. In other words, the
transfer to each household is equal to 3 per cent of the mean consumption
per capita (before taxation). A similar increase of the females wage rates
increases the mean level of the households per capita consumption by 4.9
per cent, while the level of inequality is not influenced. This result cor-
responds to increasing each households per capita consumption by 4.9 per
cent. Note 'that the relative changes in equality are larger when inequality
is measured by the Gini-coefficient than by the A-coefficient, particular
in the case where the female wage rates are increased by 20 per cent. This
means that the central part of the distribution of per capita consumption
is more strongly influenced by the wage rate changes than the lower part of
31
the distribution.
In order to evaluate the impact of behavioral labor market adjust-
ments when wage rates are changed, we have decomposed the total effects re-
ported in Table 19 into a direct and an indirect effect. The results are
displayed in Table 20. Recall that the indirect effect measures the contri-
bution from behavioral responses.
-
Table 20. Direct and indirect effects on the mean level and on the inequa-
lity in the distribution of per capita consumption by wage incre-
















female wage rates 5.3 0 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.8
20 per cent
increase in




wage rates 15.8 -4.2 0.5 -1.8 0.9 -2.7
Female wage rates
increased by
20 per cent of
the mean wage
rate 5.3 -0.4 -0.5 	 • 0.5 -0.2 09
Male wage rates
increased by
20 per cent of
the mean wage




20 per cent of
the mean wage
rate 14.5 -5.9 -3.9 0.9 	 • -4.6 	 • 1.2
According to the results in Table 20 the direct and indirect
effects have in most cases different signs, which means that the direct
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effects of the wage increments are counteracted by changes in labor market
behavior. When the females wage rates are increased changes in labor market
behavior increase the inequality in the distribution of per capita consump-
tion, while the indirect effect of increases in male wage rates have a
positive redistributive effect.
Note that we only report aggregate effects here. In Dagsvik and
Aaberge (1989) we have carried out wage change simulations for a two-person
family for the particular case in which all the random terms are equal to
zero and without any choice constraints. These simulations demonstrate that
the elasticities of hours are highly dependent on wage rate levels. The
reason why the corresponding aggregate effects are much smaller is the
large heterogeneity in preferences and in wage rates and the fact that in
many families one or several persons are "stuck" in corner solutions i.e.,
they participate at most in one sector. Such families are therefore less
responsive to wage changes compared to families where all members work in
both sectors. In addition, as we shall see below, the restrictions on
choice opportunities are very important for the occurence of a large number
of corner solutions.
5.2. Education effects
In Table 21 we report the impact of schooling through the opportu-
nity probabilities. Here the wage rates and the education variable (Maxed,
the length of schooling of the-most educated family member) in the condi-
tional profit function are kept unchanged. Thus we study the pure "opportu-
nity" effect. Contrary to the wage simulations above we obtain a large
effect from increased education. If female education is increased by one
year, female participation increases by 9.2 per cent in the wage sector.
The change in the participation rate for the selfemployment sector is
however within the simulation error margin. If male education is increased
by one year participation in wage work increases by 3.4 per cent and
remains unchanged for the selfemployment sector. If the minimum education
for females is increased to 9 years, female participation increases by 19
per cent. When the males level of schooling is increased analogously male
participation in the wage sector increases by 3.9 per cent. The cross
effects appear to be negligible.
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Table 21. Changes in sectorspecific participation rates as a result of
additional schooling when the wage rates are kept fixed.
Percentage changes from base case
Sectorspecific participation rates
Wage work 	 Selfemployment
F 	M	 F
Base case 	 0.32 	 0.62 	 0.34 	 0.35




One year of iditional schooling
for males 	 -1.3 	 3.4 	 -0.6
One year of additional schooling
for both females and males
	
7.6 	 2.4 	 -0.9
Nine years of schooling as a lower
limit for females
	
19.0 	 -1.0 	 -0.3
Nine years of schooling as a lower
limit for males 	 -1.3 	 3.9 	 -0.9
Nine years of schooling as a lower
limit for both females and males
	
18.0 	 3.5 	 -1.2
In Table 22 we also report the impact on labor supply from in-
creased education. Here only Maxed is kept unchanged. In other words, the
increase in schooling has an effect both through increased wage levels as
well as through expanded choice sets of wage work positions. The first line
demonstrates that the wage effect seems to be small compared to the impact
through the opportunity probabilities. In Table 21 we found that the corre-
sponding female participation rate increased by 19 per cent which is only
2.5 percentage points less than what - we obtained by increasing minimum
level of schooling up to nine years for the females without keeping the
wage rate fixed. The subsequent effect on mean hours of work in the wage
sector is a 25.6 per cent increase for the females and a 2.7 per cent de-
crease for the males. The corresponding increase in the conditional mean
hours given participation in the wage work sector for females is 3.3 per
cent. The other income and cross effects on hours are small. The mean wage



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































If the minimum level of schooling for males is increased up to 9
years the impact on labor supply is much less. In this case participation
in the wage work sector increases by 5.6 per cent for males and reduces by
3.5 per cent for females. Mean hours of work in the wage work sector
increases by 6.7 per cent for the males and reduces by 4.4 per cent for the
females. Other income and cross effects on labor supply are small. Con-
cerning wage earnings, they increase in this case by 14.8 per cent for
males and decrease by 5.0 per cent for females. However, the total effect
on household income is larger in this case than in the former case where
minimum education for females was 9 years.
The last line reports the effect from letting both males and
females have minimum education equal to 9 years. The results show that
female participation and mean hours in wage work increase by almost the
same amount as in the "marginal" case reported in the first line. Male par-
ticipation and mean hours in the wage work sector increase by 3,7 and 3 per
cent, respectively, which is much less than the response in the "marginal"
case of the second line.
Table 23. Changes in mean level and inequality in the distribution of con-
sumption per capita among households as a result of additional
schooling and subsequent increase in wage rates. Percentage
changes from base case.






Nine years of schooling as
lower limit for females 	 5.3
Nine years of schooling as





Nine years of schooling as






In Section 5.1 we concluded that the impact from wage changes on
the inequality in the distribution of households per capita consumption are
modest. Table 23 demonstrates that this is also the case when schooling is
increased. In spite of a considerable increase in mean per capita consump-
tion, the reduction of inequality in the distribution of per capita con-
sumption is surprisingly small. One reason for this result may be the large
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heterogeneity in wage rates and selfemployment opportunities. Since the
changes in inequality are the same whether it is measured by the Gini-coef-
ficient or the A-coefficient, we can conclude that changes in schooling
have the same impact on the lower part of the distribution of per capita
consumption as on the central part of this distribution.
6. CONCLUSION
The present chapter consists of both a descriptive and a structural
analysis. The descriptive part discusses labor market participation and
income inequality in Lima, other urban areas and rural areas, respectively.
This part also discusses decomposition of income inequality with respect to
entrepreneurial and wage earnings of household members (females, males and
children). The main results are that males wage earnings play a predominant
role of households consumption in Lima, while entrepreneurial income is the
dominating income source in both other urban areas and in rural areas. In
Lima males wage work earnings contribute by almost 40 per cent of household
consumption which seems to be a reflection of the males contribution of
hours of wage work to households total hours of work. For females the cor-
responding fractions are both about 17 per cent. The same relationship also
holds for rural areas. However, despite this similarity between the distri-
bution of hours of work and the distribution of consumption among house-
holds, consumption is considerably more unequally distributed than hours of
work. This is also the case when we examine inequality in the distribution
of welfare. As indicator of welfare we apply household consumption relative
to an equivalence scale. This indicator accounts for some of the heteroge-
neity in demographic composition of the households.
The structural part departs from the assumption that the members of
a household behave so as to maximize a household utility function given the
available resources, work and production opportunities. The corresponding
econometric model is developed by Dagsvik and Aaberge (1989). It has been
estimated for Lima and rural areas. However, we only report policy
simulation results for Lima.
The simulation results for Lima demonstrate that proportional wage
changes have only a small effect on behavior (indirect effect). It is also
remarkable that the direct effect through wage earnings affect the inequa-
lity in the distribution of per capita consumption very little. Even when
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the wage rates are increased by the same amount the indirect effect is
small. In this case, however, the inequality in the distribution of pet
capita consumption is moderately reduced.
These simulation exercises demonstrate that it is a very demanding
task to obtain a reduction of the inequality in the distribution of per




Estimates of inequality based on the Gini coefficient
In the tables below we have used a numbering which will facilitate
comparisons with the corresponding tables for the A-coefficient. Table G3
corresponds to table 3, table G8 corresponds to table 8 and table G17 to
table 17.
Table G3. Gini-inequality in distributions of hours of work for employed








(7-14) 	 (15-70) 	 All 	 Married Unmarried
Peru.. • ... ..... 	 . 	 .448 	 .249 	 .362 	 .364 	 .359
Lima ........... . 	 .557 	 .251 	 .404 	 .426 	 .379
Other urban . 	 .627 	 .275 	 .404 	 .415 	 .387
Rural. • ......... 	 .424 	 .231 	 ,318 	 .312 	 .328
Table G8. Gini-inequality*) in distributions of
hours of work among households by region
Other















*) Standard deviation in paranthesis.
Table G17. Gini-inequality in distributions of per capita household con-






Peru 	 Lima 	 urban 	 Rural
Households 	 .787 	 .567 	 .830 	 .843
	
(.043) 	 (.021) 	 (.068) 	 (.048)
Persons 	 .789 	 .553 	 • 	 .835 	 .835
	
(.020) 	 (.010) 	 (.030) 	 (.023)
Last 7 days 	 Last 12 months
Weekly Weekly 	 Weekly Weekly
hours 	 wage 	 Number 	 hours 	 wage 	 Number
of work earnings of weeks of work earnings of weeks
Main job
Second job
h 1 	kl 	r 1 	 h2 	 k2
h3 	k3	 r3 	 h4 	 k4
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APPENDIX 2
Definitions of main variables
The Peruvian Living Standards Survey records information on the two
most important jobs held by each individual in the last 7 days and in the
last 12 months prior to the survey, respectively. Accordingly, this survey
provides information about cases where the individual held one main job in
the last 7 days and another main job in the last 12 months and similar in-
formation for second jobs. Therefore annual hours of work and wage earnings
is defined by (A.1) and (A.2).
Table 1A. Measures of annual hours of work and wage earnings
4




(A.2 ) 	 annual wage earnings 	 r. k 1 .
i=1
As an illustration we give examples of three. possible outcomes of
r 1 and r2 in table 2A.
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Table 2A. Three examples of observations of main job activities in the
course of 12 months





hours 	 Number 	 hours 	 Number
of work 	 of weeks 	 of work 	 of weeks
1
	
40 	 50 	 0 	 0
2
	
0 	 0 	 40 	 50
3
	
40 	 28 	 30 	 24
Based on the measurements of wage earnings and annual hours of work
wage rate is given by
wage rate
Annual earnings 
Annual hours of work in wage sector •
Table 3A gives details of how profits from farm and non-farm pro-
duction are measured.









EXPENSES = (TOTAL MTHLY EXPENSES*NO.
MTHS ENTERPRISE OPER IN LAST YEAR)
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